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NOTES
MECHANICS' LIENS IN MONTANA
To give security to persons furnishing labor and materials for the im-
provement of realty, statutes very generally grant a so-called "mechanic's
lien" against the property which has thus been enhanced in value.' Attor-
neys are called upon frequently to deal with these statutes, and the problem
of interpretation which their provisions raise deserves an attempt to syn-
thesize the Montana law with respect to mechanics' liens. This Note will
establish from the statutes and cases which persons are entitled to the lien,
the scope of the lien given, the steps necessary to perfect it, and the degree
of priority such lien has over conflicting liens, mortgages, and conveyances.
NATURE OF THE LIEN
The mechanic's lien is a creature of statute and is not a common law
right.! It is given to protect one who has enhanced the value of property
through performing labor or furnishing materials by giving him a preferred
claim against the property for the value of labor or materials which have
become inseparably part of the building, mine or other property involved.
This lien is independent of any personal remedy he might have.' It is
remedial in character and is said to rest upon a foundation of equity and
natural justice." The Montana statute is contained in the Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947, Title 45, Chapter 5.
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
The Supreme Court of Montana has developed a definite policy for
interpretation of the different sections of the mechanic's lien law. Section
45-502 specifies the steps necessary to perfect this lien. The steps set out
are purely statutory and must be strictly followed since this chapter creates
a new right.5 Allegations of compliance with the terms of section 45-502 are
therefore jurisdictional in an action to enforce the lien.' But once these
various steps have been completed the statute will be further liberally con-
strued since it is remedial in nature and rests upon broad principles of nat-
ural equity and commercial necessity.'
-PHILLIPS, MECHANICs' LIENS § 8 (2nd ed. 1883) ; 36 AM. JJR., Mechanics' Liens
§ 6 (1941) ; Merrigan v. English, 9 Mont. 113, 22 Pac. 454 (1889) (discussing the
historical background of the Montana statute).
'The common law lien was a right to retain possession, and the laborer or material-
man was, by the nature of the subject of his work, thus precluded from this security
device available to other workmen who enhanced the value of property by labor and
materials. Fleming-Gilcrist Constr. Co. v. McGonigle, 338 Mo. 56, 89 S.W.2d 15,
107 A.L.R. 1003 (1935) ; McGlauflin v. Wormser, 28 Mont. 177, 72 Pac. 428 (1903) ;
Merrigan v. English, 9 Mont. 113, 22 Pac. 454 (1889); 36 AM. Jul?, Mechanics'
Liens § 3 (1941).
3Mochon v. Sullivan, 1 Mont. 470 (1872).
'Mochon v. Sullivan, 1 Mont. 470 (1872) ; 36 AM. Ju1., Mechanics' Liens § 4 (1941).
5McGlauflin v. Wormser, 28 Mont. 177, 72 Pac. 428 (1903).
6Ibid.
7McGlauflin v. Wormser, 28 Mont. 177, 72 Pac. 428 (1903) ; accord, Federal Land
Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489 (1939) ; Rogers-Templeton Lumber Co. v.
Welch, 63 Mont. 287, 208 Pac. 600 (1922) ; Interstate Lumber Co. v. Magill-Nevin
Plumbing & Heating Co., 57 Mont. 334, 188 Pac. 144 (1920) ; Crane & Ordway Co. v.
Baatz, 53 Mont. 438, 164 Pac. 533 (1917) ; Stritzer-Spaberg Lumber Co. v. Edwards,
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There are some principles applicable to mechanics' liens which are in-
dependent of any particular words in the statute.
1. The lien must rest upon a contract debt made by the contractor di-
rectly or indirectly with the owner of the property unless the owner chooses
to ratify what has been done or estops himself from questioning the lien.
It is not sufficient that the work enhances the value of the property.8 The
mechanic is bound by the contract he makes and cannot enforce a lien for
items in derogation of that contract.! However, if the contract between
the owner and the principal contractor provides for a waiver of lien, the
subcontractor is not bound by that waiver"0 even if he had knowledge of the
terms of the contract providing for the waiver unless he clearly assents to
be bound by its terms.'
2. A mechanic's lien is assignable upon completion of the contract, but
prior to that time, it is inchoate and not assignable." However, if a build-
ing contract is assigned before completion with the owner's consent and the
assignee completes the contract, then he is entitled to file and enforce a lien
in his own name both for his own labor and materials and for those fur-
nished by his assignor.'
3. A person who can fulfill the requirements of the chapter dealing
with mechanics' liens may file a lien under it, notwithstanding the fact that
he might also assert another type of lien.'
PERSONS ENTITLED TO LIEN
Section 45-501 specifies the persons given the right to claim a me-
chanic's lien.'1 After listing eleven occupational groups which can qualify
50 Mont. 49, 144 Pac. 772 (1914) ; Ivanhoff v. Teale, 47 Mont. 115, 130 Pac. 972
(1913) ; Western Iron Works v. Montana Pulp & Paper Co., 30 Mont. 550, 77 Pac.
413 (1904) ; Mochon v. Sullivan. 1 Mont. 470 (1872) ; Black v. Appolonio, 1 Mont.
342 (1871).
'Arnold v. Genzberger, 96 Mont. 358, 31 P.2d 296 (1934) (ratification by accepting
benefits) ;' Dewey Lumber Co. v. McQuirk, 96 Mont. 294, 30 P.2d 475 (1934).
'McGlauflin v. Wormser, 28 Mont. 177, 72 Pac. 428 (1903); Wortman v. Klein-
schmidt, 12 Mont. 316, 30 Pac. 280 (1892).
l"Morin Lumber Co. v. Person, 110 Mont. 114, 99 P.2d 206 (1940) ; Miles v. Coutts, 20
Mont. 47, 49 Pac. 393 (1897).
'Higby v. Hooper, 124 Mont. 331, 221 P.2d 1043 (1950) ; Morin Lumber Co. v. Person,
110 Mont. 114, 99 P.2d 206 (1940) ; Aikens v. Frank, 21 Mont. 192, 53 Pac. 538
(1898) (plaintiff, materialman, was a surety on contractor's bond against me-
chanics' liens and was held to be estopped).
"Davis v. Bilsland, 85 U.S. 659 (1873) ; Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold
Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 503, 111 P.2d 267, 283 (1940) ; Mason v. Germaine, 1
Mont. 263 (1870).
'Smith v. Gunniss, 115 Mont. 362, 144 P.2d 186 (1943).
"Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 489, 111 P.2d
267, 277 (1940) (entitled to repairman's lien as well as mechanic's lien).
'This section provides: "Every mechanic, miner, machinist, architect, foreman, engi-
neer, builder, lumberman, artisan, workman, laborer, and any other person, per-
forming any work and labor upon, or furnishing any material, machinery or fixture
for, any building, structure, bridge, flume, canal, ditch, aqueduct, mining claim, coal
mine, quartz lode, tunnel, city or town lot, farm, ranch, fence, railroad, telegraph,
telephone, electric light, gas, or water works or plant, or any improvements, upon
complying with the provisions of this chapter, for his work or labor done, or ma-
terial, machinery or fixtures furnished, has a lien upon the property upon which
the work or labor is done or material is furnished."
The word "property" as used in the last clause of this section has the same mean-
ing as "building, structure, bridge, flume, canal, ditch, aqueduct, mining claim, coal
[Vol. 18,
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by furnishing labor or materials the provision continues, "and any other
person performing any work and labor upon or furnishing any mate-
rial ......
The cases that have construed this section have determined that it in-
cludes, as those entitled to a lien, independent contractors and corporations
as well as those listed in the statute."6 It also encompasses subcontractors,
but how remote they may be and still claim the advantages given under this
chapter is an undecided question. In Duignan v. Montana Club,' the Mon-
tana Club contracted with one Wortman to erect the building in question.
Wortman contracted with Harrison who in turn contracted with the Helena
Co-operative, and this company contracted with the plaintiff. Thus the
plaintiff was a subcontractor in the third degree. It was held that the plain-
tiff was entitled to a lien. This holding was based on 5th Div. Comp. Stat.,
1887, sec. 1391, which provided:
All persons furnishing things or doing work, as provided by
this chapter, shall be considered subcontractors, except such as
have therefor contracts directly with the owner or proprietor, his
agent or trustee.
The court went on to say that if it were the legislature, it would never enact
such a law since it would lead to multiplicity of liens. There would be no
limit to the number of persons who might claim a lien. This section was
not contained in the codification of 1895 or thereafter. This case was fol-
lowed in Eccleston v. Hetting,' but under the same statute. Since the Ec-
cleston case, no case has contested, on the ground of remoteness, the right of
a subcontractor to have a lien. Numerous cases have allowed a subcontrac-
tor to recover, and one case allowed a subcontractor in the second degree to
maintain an action on a mechanic's lien, but this particular point was not
in issue."
mine, quartz lode, tunnel, city, or town lot, farm, ranch, fence, railroad, telegraph,
telephone, electric light, gas, or water works or plant, or any improvements"; and
is used in this section and the remaining sections of this chapter in order to avoid
repeating the long list of terms just enumerated. Stritzel-Spaberg Lumber Co. v.
Edwards, 50 Mont. 49, 144 Pac. 772 (1914).
The word "structure" a. used in this section means something that is attached
to the land under the rule of noscitur a- socii. Thus a "structure" to be lienable
must be attached to the land at the time the, labor is performed or materials used.
Barnes v. Montana Lumber & Hardware Co., 67 Mont. 481, 216 Pac. 335 (1923) (a
threshing machine is not a structure) ; Cascade Electric, Inc. v. Associated Cred-
itors, Inc., 124 Mont. 370, 224 P.2d 146 (1950) (a platform merely laid upon the
ground is not a structure). Section 67-209 provides in substance that a thing is af-
fixed to the land when it is imbedded in the ground or permanently resting upon it
or permanently attached by means of cement, plaster, nails, etc.
"Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 496, 111
P.2d 267, 280 (1940).
"16 Mont. 189, 40 Pac. 294 (1895).
"17 Mont. 88, 42 Pac. 105 (1895).
"Dean v. Stewart, 49 Mont. 506, 143 Pac. 966 (1914). In G. Zanello & Son v. Port-
land Cent. Heating Co., 70 Ore. 69, 139 Pac. 572 (1914), under a statute similar in
wording to ours, a subcontractor in the second degree was allowed to recover;
Knapp Bros. Manufacturing Co. v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 168 Mo. App. 146,
152 S.W. 119 (1912), allowed a subcontractor in the third degree to recover, but
the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1909, § 8212, expressly allowed a subcontractor
in the second degree to recover. The author has been unable to find any authority
allowing a subcontractor in the third degree or more remote to recover under a
statute similar to ours.
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The rights of subcontractors have been protected by statute in two dif-
ferent ways.' Under the New York system, which prevailed in this state
prior to 1887, a subcontractor obtains his lien by way of "equitable sub-
rogation" from the contractor, accomplished by the subcontractor 's giving
notice to the owner of his claim and of the probable value of his services or
materials. The owner is thereupon entitled to withhold from money due to
the contractor an amount sufficient to meet the subcontractor 's claim.
In 1887 the Montana statute was amended to embody the Pennsylvania
system. This rule gives a lien to the subcontractor directly rather than by
subrogation. It is based on the reasoning that by virtue of the statute the
general contractor is created the agent of the owner for the purpose of hir-
ing others, who thus have a lieui directly against the property of the "prin-
cipal." Under this system neither the amount in the original contract nor
payment to the original contractor is a limitation upon or defense to the
claim of a subcontractor, whereas under the New York system the subcon-
tractor, claiming by subrogation, cannot recover more than is remaining due
to the contractor from the owner. Thus, under the Pennsylvania system
which now exists in this state the subcontractor has a direct lien for the rea-
sonable value of his contribution to the improvements, and no notice to the
owner is necessary.
In the case of Merrigan v. English,' the owner contended that the statute
was unconstitutional since it gave the plaintiff, a subcontractor, a lien on
the premises, although the owner had no knowledge of his employment and
had not given the contractor any authority to enter into a contract with the
plaintiff. The basis of the constitutional attack was not stated by the court,
but it appeared to be based on lack of due process under the statute. To this
contention the Supreme Court of Montana replied that there is very little
difference between an agency created by a statute and an implied agency.
The owner, in contracting, does not contemplate that the contractor will do
all the work, and he does contemplate that others will be employed. He also
knows that the law gives these persons a lien. Therefore he makes the con-
tract with full knowledge of the implied agency and of his liability. Also
the owner obtains the benefits of the subcontractor's labor and can protect
himself by exacting a bond. Hence the owner has notice, and there is no
lack of due process.
LABOR AND FURNISHING OF MATERIALS
For a person to claim a lien under this chapter, the labor or materials
furnished must have been expended on the building, structure, etc., itself,
and not upon something else that produced it as a result.' Thus a person
acting as a general manager or agent of the lienee is not entitled to a lien,
but a person who is hired to do supervisory work in connection with the con-
struction is entitled to a lien.*
"Merrigan v. English, 9 Mont. 113, 22 Pac. 454 (1889).
21
Ibid.
"Smallhouse v. Kentucky and M. G. and S. M. Co., 2 Mont. 443 (1876).
'Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 499, 111
P.2d 267, 281 (1940). This case distinguished the Smallhouse case, supra, note 22,
on two different grounds. First, the claimant in the Smalhouse case was hired as
a general manager and agent of the corporation, and he was actually the corpora-
tion at the place of the work by reason of the agency. His supervision was in-
[Vol. 18,
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. Under our statute one may have a mechanic's lien for labor performed
in hauling items that will become part of the building if it is a constituent
element of the main contract." A person performing architectural services
which included such technical work as sampling of ore, metallurgical tests,
preparation of mining plant specifications and making blue prints used in
the construction of a quartz mill may claim a lien.' A miner may claim a
lien upon his employer's interest for work performed in a mine;" and a
mechanic may claim a lien for labor performed in the exploitation and sam-
pling of mining claims, such as in making repairs and alterations, building
roads, cutting cordwood for fuel, keeping machinery in order, clearing away
debris, and the like.' One may also have a lien for labor performed in re-
pairing tools and machinery if they are attached to the property.'
It is not necessary that at the time of the sale of the material there be
an understanding that the items will be used in a building, nor need they
have been furnished upon the credit of that building.' However, for ma-
terial to be the basis of a lien under this section, the material must enter
into the structure of the building and become affixed to it. The principle
on which this statute is grounded is that the materialman who enhances the
value of -the real property by furnishing material which becomes a constitu-
ent part thereof shall have security for its value.' Therefore, a stovepipe
cover which is removed when the flue is used is not lienable, nor is coal oil
for illuminating purposes, mica grease and oil for lubricating purposes, and
gasoline used for fuel, since they do not enhance the value or become part
of the machinery."
There is no decision of the Supreme Court of Montana defining the
word "material" as used in the statute, but there is a case defining the
word "material" as used in a surety's bond against mechanics' liens, which
may be helpful in determining a proper definition. In Gary Hay & Grain
Co. v. Carlson,' the Supreme Court of Montana was called upon to construe
a provision of a surety bond furnished to the state highway commission for
the construction of a road. The bond was conditioned that the contractor
should "pay all persons furnishing material or performing labor in and
about the construction." The issue concerned what the word "material"
covered. The court held that it encompassed only that which had gone into
cidental to his main task. Second, the statute under which the Smallhouse case
was decided had been amended to include the words "foreman" and "engineer"
alongside the words "workman" and "laborer." (Code of Civil Procedure, 1895, §
2130.)
"Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 491, 111
P.2d 267, 278 (1940) ; Eccleston v. Hetting, 17 Mont. 88, 42 Pac. 105 (1895).
'Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 498, 111
P.2d 267, 281 (1940).
26Id. at 494, 111 P.2d at 279.
"MCIntyre v. MacGinniss, 41 Mont. 87, 108 Pac. 353 (1910).
"Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 489, 111
P.2d 267, 277 (1940).
'Id. at 488, 111 P.2d at 277.
'OA. M. Holter Hardware Co. v. Ontario Mining Co., 24 Mont. 198, 61 Pac. 8 (1900).
"Missoula Mercantile Co. v. O'Donnell, 24 Mont. 65, 60 Pac. 594 (1900).
8A. M. Holter Hardware Co. v. Ontario Mining Co., 24 Mont. 198, 61 Pac. 8 (1900).
See also Barnes v. Montana Lumber & Hardware Co., 67 Mont. 481, 216 Pac. 335
(1923).
"'79 Mont. 111, 255 Pac. 722 (1927).
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and become a part of the completed construction, such as gravel, piles to
hold fills, explosives used for moving rock, etc., and did not refer to sup-
plies, such as hay and grain to feed horses, oil and gas for trucks, or food-
stuffs consumed by laborers in construction camps when a mere convenience
and not a necessity.
Since fixtures are part of the building, the lien given by this section ex-
tends to them." Therefore a heating plant and steam pipes which ran
through a greenhouse, ' and casing in an oil well were fixtures to which the
lien extended."
PERFECTING THE LIEN
Section 45-502 deals with the perfection of the lien. This section is
most important to the attorney since failure to comply strictly with the
terms of this section prevents the lien from arising.'
Section 45-502 provides for the time within which a lien claim must
be filed.'m Under this section the Supreme Court of Montana has determined
that if there is one contract the lien is enforceable for all the items of the
account, and the commencement of the running of time is from the delivery
of the last item, notwithstanding the fact that delivery is made upon dif-
ferent days.' Where materials are delivered under separate and distinct
contracts, the lien should be filed within the time prescribed by the statute
after the last delivery under each of such contracts.' Mere lapse of time
between furnishing part of the labor and materials and the completion of
the project, while an important circumstance, is not conclusive upon the
question of whether it falls under one or several contracts."
If the labor or material were furnished under an open account, it is
quite clear that under this statute the time for filing is ninety days after
the last item was furnished,' and if the work be abandoned by the owner
of the premises, the time for filing commences to run from the time the
work ceased."m
t Bartholomew v. James, 76 Mont. 359, 246 Pac. 771 (1926).
3 Ibid.
'Callendar v. Crossfield Oil Syndicate, 84 Mont. 263, 275 Pac. 273 (1929).
'McGlauflin v. Wormser, 28 Mont. 177, 72 Pac. 428 (1903).
'The part of § 45-502 dealing with the time within which a lien must be filed pro-
vides: "Every person wishing to avail himself of the benefits of this chapter must
file with the county clerk of the county in which the property or premises men-
tioned in the preceding section is situated, and within ninety days after the ma-
terial or machinery aforesaid has been furnished or the work or labor performed
... and when there is an open account between the parties for labor, material, or
machinery, such lien may be filed within ninety days after the date of the last
items in such account, and include all items and charges contained therein, for
material or machinery furnished for or work performed on, the property on which
the lien is claimed."
t Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 486, 111
P.2d 267, 275 (1940) ; Helena Steam-Heating and Supply Co. v. Wells, 16 Mont.
65, 40 Pac. 78 (1895).
'OHelena Steam-Heating and Supply Co. v. Wells, 16 Mont. 65, 40 Pac. 78 (1895).
"Bartholomew v. James, 76 Mont. 359, 246 Pac. 771 (1926).
t Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 487, 111
P.2d 267, 276 (1940) ; Rogers-Templeton Lumber Co. v. Welch, 63 Mont. 287, 208
Pac. 600 (1922).
"sSmith v. Gunniss, 115 Mont. 362, 144 P.2d 186 (1943): "The abandonment of an
improvement before the completion thereof, by the owner of the premises, without
fault on the part of the contractor, does not abrogate the right of the contractor,
laborers, and material men to mechanics' liens for the value of the work done and
the material furnished. In such case, the building or improvement is to be deemed
completed, so far as the rights of persons to assert liens is concerned."
[Vol. 18,
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In addition, section 45-502 provides that every lien claimant must file
an account of the amount due and a description of the property to be
charged, verified by affidavit."
The term "just and true account" as used in this section means that
a person should honestly state his account. It does not mean the amount
the court or jury would find due.' A claim for a lien for a greater amount
than a party shows himself entitled does not vitiate the lien if it was not
accompanied by fraud." From this it follows that a claim which contains
some non-lienable items will also be upheld if it results from honest error."
Further, it is not necessary that the claimant pay those who are employed
by him in order to have a valid lien, since they may be paid by the owners,
and the owner no wise prejudiced. If the claimant pays them, he simply
adds that amount to his lien." Also under the lien law as it now stands,
the owner in order to protect his property against liens should see that
the subcontractors are paid."
There is no requirement that the account be itemized. All that the
statute requires is that the lien contain "a just and true account of the
amount due." (Emphasis added.) Further, section 45-503 does not require
that the county clerk make an abstract containing an itemized account but
rather just an abstract of the "amount thereof."' It is also quite proper
if the account is itemized.'
Under section 45-502 the lien must contain:
* , * a correct description of the property to be charged with
such lien . . ., but any error or mistake in the ... description does
not affect the validity of the lien, if the property can be identified
by the description ...
As was previously mentioned, the lien given under section 45-501,' is pri-
marily upon the building, etc., and though section 45-504' extends this
lien to the land in certain instances, the property to be described under
section 45-502 is the building or improvement upon which the lien is
"This part of § 45-502 provides that every lien claimant must file "a just and true
account of the amount due him, after allowing all credits, and containing a cor-
rect description of the property to be charged with such lien, verified by affidavit,
but any error or mistake in the account or description does not affect the validity
of the lien, if the property can be identified by that description; which paper con-
taining the account, description, and nffdavit is deemed the lien .. "
"5Black v. Appolonio, 1 Mont. 342 (1871) : ".. . all that our statute requires is, that
a person wishing to avail himself of the benefits of it should honestly state his
account. The term 'just and true' does not necessarily imply more than this.
Neither does 'a just or true account' imply, necessarily, the exact account a jury
or court might find due under the contract." See also McIntyre v. MacGinniss, 41
Mont. 87, 108 Pac. 353 (1910) ; Smith v. Sherman Mining Company, 12 Mont. 524,
31 Pac. 72 (1892).
'Smith v. Gunniss, 115 Mont. 362, 144 P.2d 186 (1943) ; Eskestrand v. Wunder, 94
Mont. 57, 20 P.2d 622 (1933) ; Black v. Appolonio, 1 Mont. 342 (1871).
"Smith v. Gunniss, 115 Mont. 362, 144 P.2d 186 (1943) ; Caird Engineering Works
v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 493, 111 P.2d 267, 279 (1940).
"Smith v. Gunniss, 115 Mont. 362, 144 P.2d 186 (1943).
"Gould v. Barnard, 14 Mont. 335, 36 Pac. 317 (1894). See p. 56 supra.
'Cole v. Hunt, 123 Mont. 256, 211 P.2d 417 (1949). This section only requires that
"The county clerk must indorse . . . and make an abstract ... containing ... the
amount thereof. See also McIntyre v. MacGinniss, 41 Mont 87, 108 Pac. 353
(1910).
'Neuman v. Grant, 36 Mont. 77, 92 Pac, 43 (1907).
0See note 15 supra.
"e notte 74 Wnra,
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given." The purpose of giving a description of the improvement or build-
ing is to advise the owner or subsequent purchaser and encumbrancer of
the existence of the lien. '
All that is necessary under this section is that the property be identi-
fied by the description." The Supreme Court of Montana has said that
"any description which will enable one familiar with the locality to
identify the property upon which the lien is claimed is sufficient.''6 Thus
a description of the building alone without the description of the land
would be sufficient. ' Further, the claimant is not required to obtain a
survey to locate the improvement, nor is he required to give the boundaries
of the land. It is sufficient if the property can be identified by the name. '
In determining the sufficiency of a description of an improvement
under the above rule, a person may look to the entire contents of a lien, in-
cluding the materials used in the building, to distinguish the building the
lien is claimed upon from surrounding similar buildings.'
Ordinarily an inadequate description of the property cannot be rein-
forced by oral evidence, but if the description is ambiguous, it may be ex-
plained and the premises identified by oral evidence.' The lien will also be
upheld if, by rejecting the erroneous part of a description, enough will re-
main to identify the property. '
When the description of the property in the lien is so uncertain and
confusing that it is impossible for the court to ascertain whether any of
the lands are subject to the lien, the lien is invalid. '
"Midland Coal & Lumber Co. v. Ferguson, 61 Mont. 402, 202 Pac. 389 (1921) ; John-
son v. Erickson, 56 Mont. 550, 185 Pac. 1116 (1919) ; Stritzel-Spaberg Lumber Co.
v. Edwards, 50 Mont. 49, 144 Pac. 772 (1914) ; Western Iron Works v. Montana
Pulp & Paper Co., 30 Mont. 550, 77 Pac. 413 (1904) ; Whiteside v. Lebcher, 7 Mont.
473, 17 Pac. 548 (1888).
'Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 480, 111
P.2d 267, 273 (1940) ; Johnson v. Erickson, 56 Mont. 550, 185 Pac. 1116 (1919).
"Smith v. Sherman Mining Co., 12 Mont. 524, 31 Pac. 72 (1892).
' Western Iron Works v. Montana Pulp & Paper Co., 30 Mont. 550, 556, 77 Pac. 413,
416 (1904). The claim of lien described the building as "that certain two-story
brick mill building," and described the property insufficiently. However, there
was only one two-story brick building, and it was known as the paper mill of the
defendants. Thus the court thought the description was sufficient. See also Con-
tinental Supply Co. v. White, 92 Mont. 254, 12 P.2d 569 (1932) ; Callender v. Cross-
field Oil Syndicate, 84 Mont. 263, 275 Pac. 273 (1929) : Dean v. Stewart, 49 Mont.
506, 143 Pac. 966 (1914) ; Ivanhoff v. Teale, 47 Mont. 115, 130 Pac. ,972 (1913).
' Midland Coal & Lumber Co. v. Ferguson, 61 Mont. 402, 202 Pac. 389 (1921) ; West-
ern Iron Works v. Montana Ptilp & Paper Co., 30 Mont. 550, 77 Pac. 413 (1904).
'Midland Coal & Lumber Co. v. Ferguson, 61 Mont. 402, 202 Pac. 389 (1921) ; Smith
v. Sherman Mining Co., 12 Mont. 524, 31 Pac. 72 (1892).
0'Federal Land Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489 (1939). Here the claim
of lien described the property as "that certain frame building erected upon . . .,"
and then followed a legal description which, however, covered several frame build-
ings. The court held that the description was sufficient since a person familiar
with the locality could identify the building because only those materials listed in
the lien would be used in this particular building. Accord, Caird Engineering
Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 479, 111 P.2d 267, 272 (1940).
"Johnson v. Erickson, 56 Mont. 550, 185 Pac. 1116 (1919) ; Goodrich Lumber Co. v.
Davie, 13 Mont. 76, 32 Pac. 282 (1893).
"Midland Coal & Lumber Co. v. Ferguson, 61 Mont. 402, 202 Pac. 389 (1921). The
lien described the property as situated on the NE'4 of the NW2/ when in fact it
was on the NTWY4 of the NW . This, however, was the only building on the
NW/ and was quite generally known. The court said that if we reject the word
"NE ", the part that remains (NW'4) will be sufficient, If with the description
of the building, one familiar with the locality can identify It. Accord, Johnson v.
Erickson, 56 Mont. 550, 185 Pac. 1116 (1919).
6 'Ivanhoff v. Teale, 47 Mont. 115, 130 Pac. 972 (1913).
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 18 [1956], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/10
If one fails to establish a lien on the property because of non-observ-
ance of the statutory requirements, he cannot foreclose the lien. One can
probably correct a faulty description by filing a new lien, but when the
time for filing a lien has expired, it cannot be amended to remedy the
faulty description since there is no statute authorizing the amendment of
a mechanic's lien."
Section 45-502 also requires that the lien be "verified by affidavit;"
and this section does not contain a clause protecting against errors in the
affidavit as it does for the account and description. If the lien does not
contain an affidavit or if the affidavit is materially defective, the lien is
invalid.' The affidavit must verify that the statement of account of the
materials furnished is a just and true account, that they were furnished
iand delivered for the purpose of being used in the building, and that all
the facts stated in the notice are true; and it must also verify the descrip-
tion."
The reason for the affidavit and the test of compliance was stated
by the Supreme Court of Montana in Crane & Ordway Co. v. Baatz :0
The purpose of the affidavit is clear enough. It is not merely
to entitle the lien claim to record, but to furnish a sanction for it
in such an oath as will subject the affiant to punishment for per-
jury if it be false in material particulars.
Section 45-503' appears to prescribe the duties of the county clerk,
but the Supreme Court of Montana has construed this section as deter-
mining what the lien must contain and as interpreting the previous sec-
tion. Under this section the lien must contain "the name of the person
against whose property the lien is filed." There is a conflict of deci-
sions in this state whether the lien should contain the name of the record
owner or the person for whose use and benefit the property is improved.
It is important that this conflict be resolved since a lien failing to set
forth "the name of the person against whose property the lien is filed"
is fatally defective."
In Missoula Mercantile Co. v. O'Donnell," the Supreme Court of
Montana, on motion for rehearing, concluded that under section 45-511, de-
fining "owner" as any person "for whose use, benefit, or enjoyment any
property, building . . . is constructed, repaired, or altered, is deemed the
owner thereof . . . ,"" and under section 45-503, above, the name to be
set forth in the claim of lien is the name of the owner of the interest to
"Interstate Lumber Co. v. Magill-Nevin Plumbing & Heating Co., 57 Mont. 334, 188
Pac. 144 (1920) ; Johnson v. Erickson, 56 Mont. 550, 185 Pac. 1116 (1919).
'Crane & Ordway Co. v. Baatz, 53 Mont. 438, 164 Pac. 533 (1917).
wRogers-Templeton Lumber Co. v. Welch, 56 Mont. 321, 184 Pac. 838 (1919) ; Mills
v. Olsen, 43 Mont. 129, 115 Pac. 33 (1911).
'53 Mont. 438, 444-45, 164 Pac. 533, 535 (1917).
'This section provides: "The county clerk must indorse upon every lien the day of
its filing, and make an abstract thereof in a book by him kept for that purpose,
and properly indexed, containing the date of the filing, the name of the person
holding the lien, the amount thereof, the name of the person against whose property
the lien is filed, and the description of the property to be charged with same."
'Interstate Lumber Co. v. Magill-Nevin Plumbing & Heating Co., 57 Mont. 334,
188 Pac. 144 (1920) ; Missoula Mercantile Co. v. O'Donnell, 24 Mont. 65, 60 Pac.
594 (1900).
"'24 Mont. 65, 60 Pac. 594 (1900).
"RvisSEp CoDES or MONTANA, 1947, § 45-511,
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be affected by or charged with the lien. Further, the mention of the
record owner is not sufficient unless the labor or material is for the ben-
efit or use of his property or structure.
The court in Blose v. Havre Oil & Gas Co.," criticized this part of the
ruling of the O'Donnell case by saying:
... the name which must appear in the claim in order to en-
able the county clerk to perform his duty is not necessarily that
of "the person to whom such materials were furnished," but that
of "the person against whose property the lien is filed." The lien
affects the title of the owner at the time of filing, regardless of
who owned the property at the time the contract was made or the
lien attached; it is therefore the name of the owner at the time
of the filing which must appear.
The reason given by the court for this rule was to insure the indexing of
the lien in such a manner as to advise the owner, subsequent purchasers
or encumbrancers, and parties examining the title of the existence of the
lien. The Blose case, being later, would seem to control.
The Blose case also lays down the better rule since it is designed to in-
form subsequent purchasers and thus more fully carry out the purpose of
filing. Further, the O'Donnell case relied heavily upon the definition of
owner as given in section 45-511, but this section is not applicable to the
question. Section 45-503 does not require the owner's name as defined
in section 45-511 to be given, but rather "the name of the person against
whose property the lien is filed." If the legislature had intended the
word "owner" as defined by section 45-511 to be used, they would have
used the word "owner;" but they set up an entirely different definition.
THE SCOPE OF THE LIEN
Section 45-504 tells the attorney what property is affected by the
lien he has filed. This is important not only for foreclosure of the lien
but for bargaining purposes as well.
Under the general rule in most states, the lien attaches to the par-
ticular lot or tract on which the labor was performed or the materials
furnished," but the rule under our statute is narrower. Our statute, as
was previously shown, gives the lien primarily upon the building, struc-
ture or improvement. This section extends the lien to the land in certain
cases, however."
The first thing to be noted under this section is that a mechanic's
lien does not attach to public property." Nor can a mechanic obtain a
'296 Mont. 450, 464, 31 P.2d 738, 743 (1934).
"Bartholomew v. James, 76 Mont. 359, 246 Pac. 771 (1926) ; Big Blackfoot Milling
Co. v. Blue Bird Mining Co., 19 Mont. 454, 48 Pac. 778 (1897).
"This section provides: "The lien given extends to the lot or land upon which any
such building, improvement, or structure is situated, to the extent of one acre, if
outside of any town or city, or if within any town or city, then to the extent of
the whole lot or lots upon which the same is situated, if the land belonged to the
person who caused said building to be constructed, altered, or repaired; but if
such person owned less than a fee-simple estate in such land, then only his inter-
est therein is subject to such lien. .. "
"Whiteside v. School District No. 5, 20 Mont. 44, 49 Pac. 445 (1897),
[Vol. 18,
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lien on quasi-public property such as an irrigation district." However,
under the homestead law" as it has been construed, a mechanic's lien may
attach for both labor and material.
When the building is without a city or town, the lien extends to one
acre. The one acre which is generally affected is the one of which the
building or improvement is the geographical center." The fact that the
description in the lien includes more than one acre of land does not af-
fect the validity of the lien since all persons are charged with the knowl-
edge that the statute gives a lien on the building and to a certain area
around it, and this area can be determined by the court. '
It was early decided by the supreme court of this state that the re-
striction to one acre of land is not applicable to lode mining claims, since
a person complying with the statute has a lien upon a "quartz lode."
The words referring to a lot or tract of land upon which a building, struc-
ture, or improvement is located does not specify an acre or interest in a
lode mining claim. Therefore a lien claimant has a lien upon the entire
mining claim. '
The last part of section 45-504 provides that if a person owns less
than a fee simple estate, only his interest is bound. The interest of the
person which is bound by the lien is the interest he had at the time of
the commencement of the work, and not a lesser interest caused by a
collateral transaction to which the lien claimant was not a party.' There-
fore a lien against a contract purchaser affects only his equitable inter-
est, and the lien cannot be impressed on the property interest of the ven-
dor. This is so especially when the contract purchaser defaults and the
contract provides for a forfeiture. ' However, a building, structure, or
improvement erected thereon by the vendee can be removed by the claim-
ant even if some injury results to the realty ;' but what may be removed
is limited to the buildings, structures and improvements placed thereon
by the vendee. This seems to be reasoned from the fact that a lien claim-
ant of a lessee has a lien only on the building or structure erected upon
the land by the lessee when the lease is forfeited. '
When the building is repaired or remodeled by the vendee and he
defaults in his contract, the owner's property interest is not affected by
the lien; and the building may not be sold unless the owner has consented
to the work either directly or indirectly, or ratified the work, or unless
"Ackroyd v. Winston Bros. Co., 113 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1940).
"RzvrsID CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 33-105.
"Bonner v. Mlnnier, 13 Mont. 269, 34 Pac. 30 (1893) ; Merrigan v. English, 9 Mont.
113, 22 Pac. 454 (1889).
'6Federal Land Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489 (1939).
8' Dean v. Stewart, 49 Mont. 506, 143 Pac. 966 (1914) ; Western Iron Works v. Mon-
tana Pulp & Paper Co., 30 Mont. 550, 77 Pac. 413 (1904).
'McIntyre v. MacGinniss, 41 Mont. 87, 108 Pac. 353 (1910); Smith v. Sherman
Mining Co., 12 Mont. 524, 31 Pac. 72 (1892).
' Soliri v. Fasso, 56 Mont. 400, 185 Pac. 322 (1919).
' Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 494, 111
P.2d 267, 279 (1940) ; Block v. Murray, 12 Mont. 545, 31 Pac. 550 (1892) ; Pelton
v. Minah Consolidated Mining Co., 11 Mont. 281, 28 Pac. 310 (1891).
8 Strizel-Spaberg Lumber Co. v. Edwards, 50 Mont. 49, 144 Pac. 772 (1914).
' Dewey Lumber Co. v. McQuirk, 96 Mont. 294, 30 P.2d 475 (1934) ; Stenberg v.
Liennemann, 20 Mont. 457, 52 Pac. 84. (1898).
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the work done can be severed without materially injuring the owner's
building.'
PRIORITY OF THE LIEN
If the lien claimant furnishes material or performs labor prior to the
execution of a mortgage on the property, he is entitled to a lien against
both the building and the land prior to the mortgage. This is based on
the last sentence of section 45-504.'
The mechanic has priority over a mortgage placed on the premises
after commencement of work under the principal contract. This is true
notwithstanding the fact that the particular claimant was not employed
until after the commencement of the structure,' or furnished no labor or
material until after the mortgage, so long as the building or structure is
commenced by someone before the execution of the mortgage.' Further,
a temporary cessation of work does not prevent the operation of this section
except where there has been a change of design or evidence of an intention
to abandon prosecution of the work.'
Section 45-505°' in effect gives the mechanic a lien upon the build-
ings and improvements erected thereon by him at the request of the lessee
superior to the rights of the lessor upon forfeiture of the lease.
When the person against whom the lien is claimed is a lessee, the
lessor's interest in the property cannot be charged with the lien," but his
interest can become subject to the lien if he consents in advance to the
improvements either expressly or impliedly, or subsequently ratifies the
acts."
From an examination of this section it is seen that it gives the right
of removal to the claimant, but this section does not give the right of re-
moval when a building, structure or improvement is repaired, remodeled,
'Morin Lumber Co. v. Person, 110 Mont. 114, 99 P.2d 206 (1940) ; Dewey Lumber
Co. v. McQuirk, 96 Mont. 294, 30 P.2d 475 (1934). Here it was held that merely
because the work enhanced the value of the property it was not in itself suf-
ficient. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the owner of his property without
his fault, in other words "improving' the innocent owner out of his property
without his consent. Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489
(1939), where it was held that the giving of a mortgage by the owner does not
reduce his interest in the property to less than a fee simple estate.
'This sentence provides: "The liens for work or labor done, or material furnished,
as specified in this chapter, shall be prior to and have precedence over any mort-
gage, encumbrance, or other lien made subsequent to the commencement of the
work on any contract for the erection of such building, structure, or other im-
provement." See Louis v. Theatorium Co., 69 Mont. 50, 222 Pac. 1062 (1923).
'Davis v. Bilsland, 85 U.S. 659 (1873) ; Federal Land Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56,
90 P.2d 489 (1939).
'Merrigan v. English, 9 Mont. 113, 22 Pac. 454 (1889).
'OFederal Land Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489 (1939). (f. Continental
Supply Co. v. White, 92 Mont 254, 12 P.2d 569 (1932) (where it was held that a
conveyance is to be regarded as an "encumbrance").
9 This section provides: "When the interest in the land, building, structure, or
other improvement is a leasehold interest, the forfeiture of such lease does not
forfeit or impair such liens so far as concerns the building, structures, and im-
provements put thereon by the persons charged with such lien, but the same may
be sold to satisfy said lien, and may be removed within twenty days after the
sale thereof by the purchaser."
'Block v. Murray, 12 Mont. 545, 31 Pac. 550 (1892) ; Pelton v. Minah Consolidated
Mining Co., 11 Mont. 281, 28 Pac. 310 (1891).
'Morin Lumber Co. v. Person, 110 Mont. 114, 99 P.2d 206 (1940) ; Arnold v. Genz-
berger, 96 Mont. 358, 31 P.2d 296 (1934) (retaining benefits).
[Vol. 18,
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or improved unless the addition to the building or improvement can be
removed without material injury thereto. Therefore if the lessee puts a
new building, structure or improvement upon the land, the lien claimant
may remove it, but this is not so when the materials or labor went into the
repairing or remodeling of a building existing at the time of the lease."
In such a situation the claimant has a lien only on the leasehold estate."
A lien for materials furnished to the lessee of the land and used to
construct a building on the leased premises is not restricted as against the
lessor to the precise materials furnished, but extends to the entire build-
ing. But if part of the building had been erected prior to the lease by
the lessor, then the claimant's lien against the lessee must be restricted
to the part erected by him if it can be removed without material damage."
This rule has been extended to allow laborers inside a mine and material-
men who furnish materials for the interior of the mine to have a lien upon
structures placed upon the surface of the mine, although they cannot have
a lien upon structures and improvements placed inside the mine that can-
not be removed without material injury thereto. The reasoning is that
if the lessee is operating the mine and structures on the surface as a unit,
the mechanics and materialmen have a right to a lien on the entire inter-
est and property of the lessee.'
If the lease under which the lienee operated states that all improve-
ments erected upon the property by the lessee immediately become the
property of the lessor, this condition does not affect the right of a lien
claimant to have a lien upon the improvement and remove the same.'
It should also be noted that if a person is entitled to a lien upon the
building, but also claims a lien upon the land, which he cannot subject
thereto, the lien is not vitiated."
Section 45-506' gives a lien claimant a superior right to improve-
ments erected by him upon the land of a mortgagor over a mortgage ex-
ecuted prior to the commencement of the improvement.' The lien
acquired hereunder has priority over a prior mortgage only to the extent
of the buildings, structures, or improvements erected upon the land, and
"Dewey Lumber Co. v. McQuirk, 96 Mont. 294, 30 P.2d 475 (1934) ; Stenberg v.
Liennemann, 20 Mont. 457, 52 Pac. 84 (1898).
'Stenberg v. Liennemann, 20 Mont. 457, 52 Pac. 84 (1898).
"Stenberg v. Liennemann, 20 Mont. 457, 52 Pac. 84 (1898); Montana Lumber &
Manufacturing Co. v. Obelisk Mining Concentrating Co., 15 Mont. 20, 37 Pac. 897
(1894).
wCaird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 494, 111
P.2d 267, 279 (1940).
O"Caird Engineering Works v. Seven-Up Gold Mining Co., 111 Mont. 471, 495, 111
P.2d 267, 280 (1940) ; Montana Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Obelisk Mining
Concentrating Co., 15 Mont. 20, 37 Pac. 897 (1894). In the latter case the court
said: "The statute so providing is paramount to the conditions of the lease, and
the lien which the statute creates is not destroyed by a provision of the lease to
the effect that the improvements by way of buildings or mill for the reduction
of ore shall inure to the lessor as soon as the same is placed on the premises."
'Morrow v. Dahl, 66 Mont. 351, 213 Pac. 602 (1923).
1.This section provides: "The liens attach to the buildings, structures, or improve-
ments for which they were furnished or the work was done in preference to any
prior lien, encumbrance, or mortgage upon the land upon which said buildings,
structures, or improvements are erected; and any person enforcing such lien may
sell the same under execution, and the purchaser may remove the property sold
within a reasonable time thereafter."
1'Grand Opera House Co. v. Maguire, 14 Mont. 558, 37 Pac. 607 (1894).
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clearly does not give a lien preference to a prior mortgage as to the
land.'3 While the general rule is that a mortgage recorded prior to com-
mencement of the work takes precedence over all liens for materials fur-
nished, the Supreme Court of Montana in Interstate Lumber Co. v. Rider'
said that our statute relaxes this rule to the extent of giving priority to liens
for buildings, structures or other improvements erected on the mortgaged
lands:
The test of preference, under this type of statute, is whether
there is a distinct and independent improvement, erected on the
premises or merely repairs, extension or remodeling of an existing
building or structure; if the first, the lien has preference; if the
second, the priority of the mortgage lien continues unimpaired.'
An attempt to go farther and deprive the mortgagee of anything which was
covered by his mortgage when it was given would be unconstitutional in
that it would be taking property without due process of law. Of course if
the remodeling is such that it can be removed without material damage to
the original building, the lien may attach to the improvement in preference
to the prior mortgage.'
Under this section, the purchaser at the execution sale may remove the
building, structure, or improvement when it is determined under the above
rules that the lien is prior to the mortgage as to the building, structure or
improvement. The purchaser may remove the improvement even when it
would involve great loss, such as when the improvement was made of brick
or stone; and the mortgagee cannot complain, since he can protect himself
by redeeming or by buying the improvement from the purchaser. Also the
mortgage was not given when the improvements were upon it, and thus the
mortgagee relied only on the land as security.' '
Section 45-506 provides that the purchaser may remove the property
within a reasonable time after the sale. What is meant by a reasonable
time was determined in Grand Opera House Co. v. Maguire' where the
'Johnson v. Puritan Mining Co., 19 Mont. 30, 47 Pac. 337 (1896). In this case the
court stated: "The mechanic, therefore, has a lien upon the land paramount to
all right accruing after the commencement of his work, and what he puts upon
the land paramount to all other claims, whether created before or after that
time." The court then went on to say that our statutes, in thus giving a lien
upon the building or improvements separate from the land, seem to wipe out the
common law rule that buildings attach to the real estate.
10393 Mont. 489, 19 P.2d 644 (1933). The court also said in determining whether a
materialman may have the house sold for materials used in the repair of that
structure free of a prior mortgage: "The divergence in wording between sections
8342 [now section 45-504], and 8344 [now section 45-506], above, is significant;
under the first the lien takes precedence over 'any mortgage ... made subsequent
to the commencement of work,' while the second provides that the 'liens attach
to the buildings, structures, or improvements . . . in preference to any prior ...
mortgage upon the land,' thus providing for a severance of a building erected on
mortgaged land from the land, leaving the mortgagee 'all that his mortgage
covered when the same was given.'" The court then defined the word "improve-
ments" as used in this section as an addition to the property rather than repairs
made on a building.
1"4Id. at 495, 19 P.2d at 647.
m05Id. at 496, 19 P.2d at 647.
'Grand Opera House Co. v. Maguire, 14 Mont. 558, 37 Pac. 607 (1894).
"'Ibid. The facts of this case were that the plaintiff, mortgagee, was seeking to
foreclose his mortgage which was made prior to the commencement of the im-
provement made by the defendant. Previous to this foreclosure action, the de-
fendant had foreclosed his lien without joining the mortgagee and had purchased
(Vol. 18,
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Supreme Court of Montana reasoned that the law not only provides that
the lien attach to the buildings but also to whatever interest the proprietor
might have in the land; and here the proprietor had a right of redemption
and a right of occupancy of the premises until those rights were cut off by
foreclosure of the prior mortgage. These rights the defendant obtained
upon the foreclosure sale of the premises under his mechanic's lien.
Therefore, having succeeded to the rights of the proprietor in
the premises, the lienor would seem to be entitled to remain in pos-
session, with the improvement, until the prior mortgagee, by fore-
closure, cuts off that right of possession of the land.'
If he is required to straightway remove the building he would still be at
liberty to return and occupy the premises, because he had the proprietor's
right of possession and use of the land until the prior mortgage is foreclosed;
• .. but, if he does not see fit to take advantage of the right of
redemption from the mortgage, his possession ought to give way at
the point where the proprietor's right of possession would have
ceased; and his right to the building being superior to the prior
mortgage, it would seem that the reasonable time with which the
purchaser under the lien foreclosure should remove the building
would be prior to the time when he must yield possession of the land
to the mortgagee under his foreclosure proceedings.'
CONCLUSION
The mechanic's lien is a purely statutory device designed to protect
parties who have enhanced the value of property by performing labor there-
on or furnishing materials therefor. Because this is a departure from the
common law, compliance with the statute is strictly required to perfect the
lien. Once perfection of the lien obtains, however, the remedial character
of this legislation makes requisite a liberal interpretation of its provisions.
Mechanics or materialmen who have a lien on the improvement may ex-
tend the lien to the land only when the enhancement is requested or
acquiesced in by one owning an interest in the land. As a security device,
the lien has precedence over any subsequent mortgages on the land and
priority even over prior mortgages as to an improvement erected on the
land. The lien attaches to the property as of the time the prime contractor
icommences work and the lien of each subcontractor relates back to that
time. The purchaser at the execution sale may remove the improvement
and the lien may be foreclosed against the land. Thus it is that protection
is afforded those who expend labor or materials on another's property at
the latter's instance.
DWAIN H. STTFFLEBEAM
the improvement at the foreclosure sale. In this foreclosure action the defend-
ant is seeking to restrict the decree to the land alone. The mortgagee contend-
ed that the defendant lost his right to remove the building since he made no
provisions in the lien foreclosure proceedings for the removal, and, also, the de-
fendant remained in possession of the property and improvement for three years
which was not a reasonable time.
"Id. at 564, 37 Pac. at 609.
lOId. at 565, 37 Pac. at 609.
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